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The Fiscal Responsibility Act’s mandatory 
requirement to use generally accepted 
accounting standards in the government’s 
accounts was a step forward, even if it 
merely made obligatory what was by then 
happening anyway. Arguably this helped 
reduce the risk of a future government 
sliding backwards into creative accounting. 
But the requirement to report against 
certain principles of responsible fiscal 
management seemed subjective. That 
is, the principles themselves seemed to 
leave too much room for interpretation. I 
thought it would be too easy to nominate 
soft targets as to what was prudent. And too 
easy to explain away poor performance.
Yet over the years since 1994 a 
remarkable number of countries have 
adopted fiscal responsibility regimes, even 
down to copying the name. Of course, 
that doesn’t prove that the regime is 
worthwhile here. But Brazil, Germany, 
Ghana, India, Nigeria and the United 
States presumably thought they were 
doing something worthwhile when they 
adopted similar rules.
What these regimes share with the 
Regulatory Responsibility Bill, and, 
for that matter, the Reserve Bank Act, 
is that they are all about transparency. 
Notoriously, the Reserve Bank regime 
doesn’t stop a government changing 
the bank’s inflation target. But it can’t 
do so secretly, as happened when the 
government rather than the bank used to 
manipulate the country’s money supply. 
What the act ensures is not low inflation, 
but transparency.
Similarly, the Fiscal Responsibility 
Act (which is now part of the Public 
Finance Act) and the proposed Regulatory 
Responsibility Act both involve open 
reporting against pre-set principles. The 
Fiscal Responsibility Act doesn’t stop 
the government running a deficit – i.e. 
spending more than it is raising in taxes, 
as it is right now. And the Regulatory 
Responsibility Act wouldn’t stop a 
government (or an individual member 
of Parliament) introducing legislation 
that cut across established principles 
(such as those in the Legislation Advisory 
Committee’s guidelines) any more than at 
present. But they would have to be more 
transparent about it.
So the approach of defining key 
principles in advance and assessing 
legislation against them is not new. Apart 
from the Public Finance Act and the 
Reserve Bank Act, officials and ministers 
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are currently supposed to consider whether 
draft bills comply with the Legislation 
Advisory Committee’s guidelines. But, 
as their name implies, these are merely 
guidelines; in practice they are often 
ignored, especially, where it matters most, 
by the Cabinet. 
Another regime, close to the heart of 
the legislative process, also judges one 
subset of laws – namely regulations – in 
the light of pre-set principles. I refer 
to the Regulations Review Committee. 
As presumably most readers will know 
well, this is a standing committee of the 
House of Representatives whose terms of 
reference are set out in the Standing Orders 
of the House. The committee customarily 
examines all regulations shortly after they 
are promulgated. It does this against nine 
criteria, any of which can form grounds 
for drawing a regulation to the attention 
of parliament.
Some of these grounds use archaic 
language, such as that a regulation 
‘trespasses unduly on personal rights 
and liberties’. Some are narrow: for 
example, that the regulation ‘excludes 
the jurisdiction of the courts without 
explicit authorisation in the enabling 
statute’. Others are broader and more 
subjective: for example, that the regulation 
‘contains matter more appropriate for 
parliamentary enactment’, or it ‘appears 
to make some unusual or unexpected use 
of the [statutory] … powers under which 
it was made’. 
These latter grounds of review remind 
us that this system of review applies only to 
regulations, although this term is defined 
broadly in the Regulations (Disallowance) 
Act 1989. In fact the Regulations Review 
Committee also looks at a number of bills, 
to the extent that they contain the powers 
to make regulations. The committee 
considers whether these powers have been 
framed too broadly or would allow the 
imposition of retrospective penalties, for 
example. On occasion the committee has 
also been asked to advise on regulations 
that have not yet been promulgated.
Despite having operated for many 
years, this system is not well known.1 
Nevertheless, in the writer’s opinion it 
works well. I am influenced in this view 
by the experience of having chaired the 
committee between 1990 and 1993. It is a 
specialist committee and operates largely 
away from the public eye. But it provides 
a means of reviewing any regulation, 
whenever it was made. So, something 
that seemed innocuous at the time it was 
drafted and promulgated can be examined 
years later, but only against those nine pre-
set principles or criteria, the last of which 
is something of a catch-all: ‘for any other 
reason concerning its form or purport 
[the regulation] calls for elucidation’.
The mechanism of reviewing bills 
and regulations against a small number 
of fundamental principles is the core 
procedure now proposed in the Regulatory 
Responsibility Bill. Earlier versions of 
this bill put more emphasis on officials 
reviewing their department’s attention to 
key regulatory principles and producing 
annual statements of compliance. The 
taskforce, which reviewed the previous 
proposals, saw more benefit in a mechanism 
which applied at the front end, so to speak, 
and to every proposed bill or regulation. 
Yet the mechanism we suggested is not 
without precedent. Nor would it, in our 
judgment, involve very much more effort 
than is in theory at least already supposed 
to be devoted to such compliance activity. 
The Regulations Review Committee is a 
form of ex post scrutiny rather than an ex 
ante safeguard. Another, closer analogy 
to our recommended approach is the 
requirement that the attorney-general 
consider whether proposed bills will 
comply with or breach the principles in 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. Our 
recommendation would neither usurp 
nor duplicate that process. In effect it 
would add a further set of principles as 
review criteria and would impose a review 
and disclosure obligation on all ministers 
or agencies proposing bills or regulations.
The points raised thus far in debate 
on this proposal echo discussion which 
took place amongst the taskforce itself. Is 
it right to encompass all regulations and 
all bills? Well, all regulations are currently 
reviewed, albeit after the event. Bills are 
even more important and categorising 
them into some that matter and some 
that don’t seems problematic. On the 
other hand, the ‘principles of responsible 
regulation’ we proffer are unlikely to be the 
last word on things that matter. Is the list 
proposed too narrow? The taskforce did 
consider simply giving some form of legal 
force to the current Legislation Advisory 
Committee guidelines, from which these 
principles have largely been derived. 
Those included in the draft bill are indeed 
only a selection of what seem to be the 
most important issues to consider and 
principles to preserve. The LAC guidelines 
will remain an important source of advice 
for ministers and law drafters. But, bluntly, 
since they are often ignored at present it 
seems we need something more.
Then there is the suggestion that in 
any event our suggested process may be 
ineffective, since ministers will remain 
free to propose and parliament to adopt 
legislation which does not comply with 
these selected principles. Partly this query 
underlines the point made earlier that the 
essence of the process is transparency. The 
same point may be said of the parallel 
provision in the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act. This too does not prevent legislation 
which violates these rights. But it does 
draw attention to such infringements, 
arguably adding to the quality of public 
debate.
I would argue that if what is proposed 
is not the final answer, it is at least a 
reasonable start. More, it would be an 
improvement on the present legislative 
processes. But perhaps the most important 
question to consider in response to these 
proposals is: do we accept that our current 
approach to legislation presents problems? 
What does seem widely accepted is that 
Notoriously, the Reserve Bank regime doesn’t stop 
a government changing the bank’s inflation target. 
But it can’t do so secretly, as happened when the 
government rather than the bank used to manipulate 
the country’s money supply. 
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our system contains fewer checks and 
balances compared to many others. Our 
unicameral legislature, the supremacy our 
courts accord to acts of parliament, and 
the absence of any single, clear statement 
of constitutional principles are all well 
known as disadvantages or at least risks in 
our current parliamentary system.
The adoption of MMP – mixed-
member proportional representation 
– as the means of electing members of 
parliament has not diminished these 
risks or deficiencies. Nor has it made 
the legislative process more principled. 
Indeed, it may have made it less so, at least 
in the sense that the introduction of more 
parties has at times made the process more 
opaque as well as slower. The speed with 
which legislation was enacted under the 
first-past-the-post electoral system was 
certainly a source of criticism. But I would 
argue that slowing down the legislative 
process has not made it more principled.
The taskforce’s report gives examples 
of legislation that has generated 
controversy in recent years. These 
include the cancellation of the West 
Coast Accord whilst specifically denying 
a right to compensation; the passage 
of the Foreshore and Seabed Act; the 
unbundling of Telecom’s local loop; 
and the amendment to the Overseas 
Investment Regulations in the context of 
the Canadian bid for Auckland airport. 
Whatever one thinks of these issues, none 
of them could be thought trivial.
My own favourite example of 
unprincipled legislation (or in this 
case regulation) is cited on page 47 
of the taskforce’s report. It concerns 
a 1993 amendment to the Freshwater 
Fish Farming Regulations. A previous 
government had allowed the farming 
of marron, or freshwater crayfish. A 
new government changed this policy, 
as it was entirely entitled to do. It also 
decided that the country’s sole freshwater 
crayfish farm needed to close. But instead 
of purchasing this farm, or negotiating 
some form of compensated exit, the 
government promulgated regulations that 
prohibited the sale (or transfer from the 
farm by anyone other than an official) of 
freshwater crayfish. The farm was, in short, 
ring-fenced. It was also rendered valueless. 
About the only lawful activity left would 
have been to cook the remaining crayfish 
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and eat them, on that site. This was a 
classic case of expropriation without 
compensation.
Understandably, the case came before 
the Regulations Review Committee. The 
committee directed its chair to discuss 
the matter with the minister. He agreed to 
reconsider the measure, including the issue 
of compensation; a satisfactory conclusion 
was reached. The result was a good 
outcome of a poor process. In one sense, I 
would argue, it vindicated the regulations 
review process: at least the disadvantaged 
business had a ‘court’ to which to appeal. 
But not before the regulations had been 
promulgated. And not without giving the 
property owners considerable heartache. 
Expropriation without compensation is 
just one example of where ministers and 
parliament on occasion pay insufficient 
attention to the basic principles. But such 
oversight does occur. It shouldn’t, and it’s 
wrong.
In essence, the taskforce report simply 
argues that a principle as clear and obvious 
and well-settled as this needs to be given 
greater status. I would make exactly the 
same argument for the principle that 
public agencies and parliament should 
not adversely affect people’s rights and 
liberties or impose obligations on people 
retrospectively. Nor should they seek to 
protect administrative decisions from 
judicial review. Or impose charges for 
goods and services that are not reasonable 
in relation to their benefits or costs. All 
of these I witnessed on more than one 
occasion during my time in parliament.
None of these are new principles. 
They have been argued for by many over 
many years. But instead of having to turn 
to ad hoc reports of the Audit Office (on 
the reasonableness of charges) or past 
speakers’ rulings or parliamentary debates, 
the taskforce suggests bringing the key 
principles from these and the Legislation 
Advisory Committee’s guidelines into one 
high-profile document. We then advocate 
requiring them to be considered, and 
making each minister accountable for 
that happening, and allowing the courts 
to rule if they don’t.
None of these steps is novel, not even 
the last. A similar jurisdiction already 
exists under our Human Rights Act 1993, 
as well as the United Kingdom’s Human 
Rights Act 1998. Our proposal would not 
allow the courts to strike down any act 
or regulation. But it might, as appears to 
be the case in the United Kingdom, cause 
a government to rethink a law found 
contrary to any of the act’s principles. 
That seems to me to be exactly what the 
courts are there for. 
Some years ago I was one of those who 
were prepared to contemplate giving New 
Zealand courts the powers to strike down 
acts of our parliament that were found to 
be contrary to a bill of rights. That proposal 
went too far for many, even though it 
is commonplace in a number of other 
developed democracies. The proposals 
made in this bill would do much less. 
But they are motivated by the same sense 
that on too many occasions, governments 
and parliament ignore fundamental 
principle. The Regulatory Responsibility 
Bill proposes a set of processes which will 
help invigilate our parliamentary system 
without undermining its authority. To my 
mind they are the least our situation calls 
for.
The taskforce also suggested, with 
appropriate deference, that parliament 
might care to strengthen its own internal 
systems. A Regulatory Responsibility 
Act would be reinforced in practice if a 
committee such as the Regulations Review 
Committee were to routinely consider all 
bills, as it now considers all regulations, 
but on their way through parliament 
rather than after the event. As we noted, 
this happens already with bills, but only 
with respect to their regulation-making 
or empowering clauses, not wider issues 
of principle.
Many parliaments which, like New 
Zealand’s, draw their heritage from the 
House of Commons have committees 
like our Regulations Review Committee. 
Some of these do look at bills as well as 
regulations, and from a wider perspective 
than our committee. The Australian federal 
parliament is one example. Queensland’s 
legislature is another: its Scrutiny of 
Legislation Committee applies something 
called the Legislative Standards Act, which 
sets out ‘fundamental legislative principles’, 
including that draft laws ‘provide for the 
compulsory acquisition of property only 
with fair compensation’. It seems a weak 
argument that if Queensland can do 
this, why can’t we? But it is still a good 
question.
Let me end this call for action where I 
began, with a comparison with past, similar 
efforts to judge the actions of governments 
on a principled basis and so improve the 
quality of the country’s performance. 
Recently the British Labour government 
has proposed a fiscal responsibility law. 
It included this measure in the latest 
speech from the throne, in preparation 
for forthcoming elections and in response 
to grave fiscal and economic challenges. 
Fortunately, the international recession 
seems to have done less damage here. 
But the challenge of legislating without 
damage to long-standing rights seems 
no less a one here than in the mother of 
parliaments. 
The answer to both sets of challenges, 
economic and legislative, seems 
appropriately similar: identify the key 
principles that governments should 
honour and examine actions openly 
against them. Continuing to rely on 
tenuous acceptance of unarticulated 
principles and ad hoc reviews seems 
inadequate. A general review of both 
problem and solutions has led to this 
suggested reform. It deserves better 
consideration than it has so far received.
1  Before the Regulations Review Committee was established 
in 1985 a similar jurisdiction was exercised by the Statutes 
Revision Committee.
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